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Abstract
This Comment argues that the Federal Circuit correctly rejected Customs’ “most direct cause”
test. Part I explains the transaction value of the imported merchandise valuation method and traces
its legislative history. In addition, Part I reviews Customs and prior judicial treatment of middle-
man import transactions. Part II describes the Federal Circuit’s decision in Nissho Iwai. Part III
argues that Customs’ “most direct cause” test is contrary to judicial precedent and unsupported
by the legislative history of Section 402. Part III also discusses the implications and limitations
of Nissho Iwai for American importers. This Comment concludes that Nissho Iwai represents a
significant decision in customs valuation law and U.S. importers that purchase merchandise from
non-U.S. middlemen will benefit by paying less duties.
NISSHO IWAI AMERICAN CORP. V. UNITED STATES:
CUSTOMS APPRAISEMENT AND MIDDLEMAN
PRICING UNDER SECTION 402 OF THE
TARIFF ACT OF 1930
INTRODUCTION
U.S. customs law' requires'importers to pay customs duties
on imported merchandise unless an exception exists for duty-
free entry.2 Since most customs duties are calculated as a per-
centage of the appraised value of the imported merchandise,3
appraisal plays an important role in determining the amount of
duty an importer pays.4 U.S. customs law delegates the responsi-
1. RUTH F. STURM, CUSTOMS LAW & ADMINISTRATION at 41 (3d ed. 1993). Customs
Law is the field of administrative law concerned with government procedures and regu-
lations affecting the importation and exportation of merchandise into and from the
United States. Id.
2. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1988) (general notes 1, 3, 4). The current version of 19
U.S.C. § 1202 is located in U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of
the United States, USITC Pub. No. 2449 (1993) [hereinafter HTSUS]. The HTSUS lists
those goods subject to duty and those goods entitled to duty-free entry. Id.
To determine whether the Customs law imposes duty on imported merchandise, or
otherwise restricts its importation, the importer must consult the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States to classify the merchandise. Peggy Chaplin, An Introduc-
tion to the Harmonized System, 12 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 417 (1987) [hereinafter
Harmonized System]. Classifying imported merchandise involves selecting the item num-
bers with accompanying language descriptions which are most appropriate and specific
to the imported merchandise. Id. Importers and Customs often disagree on the
proper classification of imported merchandise. Id. Once the proper classification is
determined, however, the selected item number provides the amount of duty imposed
on the entry. Id.
An entry consists of filing the forms and documents required to permit customs
officials to determine whether specific merchandise is admissible and whether it may be
released from customs custody and an entry also includes the filing of such other docu-
mentation necessary to enable customs officers to assess duties, collect accurate statis-
tics, and determine whether requirements of laws other than customs laws are met. 19
U.S.C. § 1484 (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 142.3 (1992). See 1 BRUCE E. CLUBB, UNITED STATES
FOREIGN TRADE LAw 375-419 (1991) (providing example of standard import transaction
and regulations that affect import transactions).
3. STURM, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 1; DAviD SERuO, IMPORT PRACrICE: CUSTOMS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 107 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter SERKO]; SAUL L. SHERMAN AND
HINRICH GLASHOFF, CUSTOMS VALUATION: COMMENTARY ON THE GATT CUSTOMS VALUA-
TION CODE 51 (1988) [hereinafter COMMENTARY). There are three types of customs du-
ties: ad valorem, specific, and combination. STURM, supra note 1, § 1.1. Ad valorem du-
ties are calculated as a percentage of the value of the dutiable merchandise. Id. Spe-
cific duties are calculated on the basis of quantity, i.e., U.S.$x per unit. Id.
Combination duties are calculated using both ad valorem and specific rates, i.e., U.S.$x
per unit plus a percent of the dutiable merchandise. Id.
4. SERKO, supra note 3, at 107.
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bility of appraising the value of imported merchandise to the
U.S. Customs Service ("Customs").'
Section 402 of the Tariff Act of 1930 ("Section 402"), as
amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, provides the
statutory basis for appraising of imported merchandise.6 Under
Section 402, the transaction value of the imported merchandise
is the primary7 method of calculating appraised value.' Section
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1500 (1988); STURM, supra note 1, §§ 4.2, 6.1, 6.2. The United States
Customs Service is an agency of the Department of the Treasury charged with the re-
sponsibility of assessing and collecting duties on imported merchandise, and enforcing
the customs laws and related statutes. Id. Customs utilizes a regional management sys-
tem, where the United States customs territory is divided into seven regions. STURM,
supra note 1, § 4.1, at 68. Each region is subdivided into districts, which, in turn, are
subdivided into ports of entry and subports. Id. Each district is managed by a district
director. Id.; see 19 C.F.R. § 101.3 (1992) (describing Customs regions, districts, and
ports).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a (1988). The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 ("TAA") imple-
mented a number of changes to United States trade law which were necessary to imple-
ment the trade agreements negotiated by the United States in the Tokyo Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATr"), including adoption of the new customs valuation code. H.R. Doc. No. 153,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 389 (1979) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACrION]. The GATT is an international agreement subscribed to by almost all nations
of the free world. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. (pts. 5 & 6) A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1947) [hereinafter GATT]; EUGENE
T. ROSSIDES, U.S. IMPORT TRADE REGULATIONS 401, 416-17 (1986). The GATT estab-
lishes rules for the conduct of international trade. Id.; ALAN C. SWAN &JOHN F. MUR-
PHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS (1991).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(a). Section 402 provides that Customs shall appraise im-
ported merchandise using the transaction value of the imported merchandise, unless
the transaction value of the imported merchandise cannot be determined. Id.
§ 1401a(a) (1) (A). In addition, Customs may use the transaction value of the imported
merchandise only if certain conditions are met. Id. § 1401a(b) (2). First, there must be
a sale for exportation to the United States. Id. § 1401a(b) (1); see Orbisphere Corp. v.
United States, 726 F. Supp. 1344 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) (holding transaction value of
imported merchandise unavailable where evidence demonstrated sales of products
were concluded in United States by U.S. company for sale to U.S. customers). The situs
of the sale is, however, irrelevant to determining whether the transaction is a sale for
exportation to the United States. General Notice, 26 Cust. B. & Dec., No. 8, at 13 (Jan.
27, 1992). Second, there must be sufficient information to establish the accuracy of
the invoice price. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b) (1). "Sufficient information" means informa-
tion that establishes the accuracy of any adjustment. Id. § 1401a(h) (5). The term "ad-
justment" refers to the additions and deductions to the price paid or payable for the
imported merchandise that are described in § 1401a(b) (1), (3). Third, the transaction
value of the imported merchandise may be used to appraise merchandise imported in a
transaction between "related parties" only if the parties' relationship does not influence
the price, or if the price closely approximates certain test values of identical or similar
merchandise. Id. § 1401a(b) (2) (B). Related parties are defined by statute as:
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402 states that the transaction value of the imported merchan-
dise is equivalent to the price actually paid or payable for the
(A) Members of the same family, including brothers and sisters (whether by
whole of half blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants.
(B) Any officer or director of an organization and such organization.
(C) An officer or director of an organization and an officer or director of
another organization, if each such individual is also an officer or director
in the other organization.
(D) Partners.
(E) Employer and employee.
(F) Any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with
power to vote, 5 percent or mote of the outstanding voting stock or shares
of any organization and such organization.
(G) Two or more persons directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or
under common control with, any person.
Id. § 140.1a(g). Related parties should also note that the transaction value of the im-
ported merchandise limits the related.U.S. importer's tax deduction for costs of goods
sold. 26 U.S.C. § 1059A.
If there are restrictions on the disposition or use of the merchandise, if the sale is
subject to any condition for which a value cannot be determined, or if an adjustment
for benefits that accrue to the seller cannot be made, then Customs must use an alter-
native valuation method. Id § 1401a(b) (2) (A) (i)-(iii).
If the transaction value of the imported merchandise cannot be determined, other
possible statutory bases of valuation are utilized in the following order of preference:
the transaction value of identical merchandise, the transaction value of similar mer-
chandise, the deductive value, and the computed value. Id. § 1401a(a)(1)(B)-(E). If
computed value cannot be determined, appraised value may be determined from one
of the other methods of valuation by making reasonable adjustments. Id.
§ 1401a(a) (1)(F).
Appraisal under the transaction value of identical or similar merchandise methods
is similar to appraisement under the transaction value of the imported merchandise.
SERUO, supra note 3, at 125. The principal difference is that the transaction value of
identical or similar merchandise looks to the price paid or payable for identical or
similar merchandise exported to the United States at about the same time that the
merchandise being appraised is exported to the United States. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1401a(c)(1); SERKo, supra note 3, at 126; See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401a(h)(2) and
1401a(h) (4) (defining terms "identical" and "similar").
Appraisal under the deductive value method is calculated by using the price at
which the merchandise being appraised, or identical or similar merchandise is sold in
the United States and making certain deductions. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(d); SERKO, supra
note 3, at 127-31.
Appraisal under the computed value method is calculated as the sum of (1) materi-
als, fabrication, and other processing used in the production of the imported merchan-
dise, (2) profits and general expenses, (3) assists not included in other items, and (4)
packing costs, 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(e); SEUCO, supra note 3, at 131-32.
Finally, if Customs cannot appraise the imported merchandise using any of the
above methods, it may appraise the imported merchandise using a method derived
from one of the above valuation methods. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(f); SERKO, supra note 3, at
132-33.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a.
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merchandise when sold for exportation to the United States.9
Use of the transaction value of the imported merchandise
to appraise imported merchandise is complicated by the fact
that two separate transactions may qualify as sales for exporta-
tion to the United States."° For example, a Japanese middle-
man" may contract with a Japanese manufacturer for the pro-
duction of merchandise ordered by a U.S. importer. The trans-
action between the Japanese middleman and the Japanese
manufacturer (the "first tier transaction") qualifies as a sale for
exportation to the United States if the Japanese manufacturer
sells merchandise to the Japanese middleman for ultimate ex-
port to the United States.' Additionally, the transaction be-
tween the Japanese middleman and the U.S. importer (the "sec-
ond tier transaction") qualifies as a sale for exportation to the
United States since the Japanese middleman sells and exports
the merchandise to the U.S. importer.' 3 When two sales form
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1). The precise definition of "transaction value of im-
ported merchandise" is:
[T]he price actually paid or payable for the merchandise when sold for expor-
tation to the United States, plus amounts equal to -
(A) the packing costs incurred by the buyer with respect to the imported
merchandise;
(B) any selling commission incurred by the buyer with respect to the im-
ported merchandise;
(C) the value, apportioned as appropriate, of any assist;
(D) any royalty or license fee related to the imported merchandise that
the buyer is required to pay, directly or indirectly, as a condition of the sale of
the imported merchandise for exportation to the United States; and
(E) the proceeds of any subsequent resale, disposal, or use of the im-
,ported merchandise that accrue, directly or indirectly, to the seller.
Id. The term "price paid or payable" is defined as:
(A) .. .the total payment (whether direct or indirect, and exclusive of any
costs, charges, or expenses incurred for transportation, insurance, and
related services incident to the international shipment of the merchan-
dise from the country of exportation to the place of importation in the
United States) made, or to be made, for imported merchandise by the
buyer to, or for the. benefit of, the seller.
Id. § 1401a(b) (4) (A).
10. SrunM, supra note 1, § 47.2, at 12-14.
11. Distribu-Dor, Inc. v. Karadanis, 11 Cal. App. 3d 463, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235
(1970) (defining middleman as one who buys at one price frommanufacturer for re-
sale at higher price); BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 992 (6th ed. 1990). As used in this Com-
ment, the term "middleman" refers to one who buys at one price from a manufacturer
for resale at a higher price. Id.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a.
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a.
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the basis of the transaction value of the imported merchandise,
as in the case of transactions involving middlemen, Section 402
fails to provide guidance as to which sale sets the transaction
value. 14
Prior to the recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit 5 in Nissho IwaiAmerican Corp. v. United States, 6
importers and Customs disagreed on whether the first tier trans-
action may form the basis of the transaction value of imported
merchandise. 7 Customs ruled, based on the legislative history
of Section 402, that the first tier transaction may form the basis
14. Saul L. Sherman, Rejections on the New Customs Valuation Code, 12 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 119, 144 (1980) [hereinafter Reflections].
15. STURM, supra note 1, § 34.2, at 3. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982 created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which replaced the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims. Federal Courts Improvement
Act, Pub. L. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.); STURM, supra note I § 34.2, at 3. Decisions rendered by the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals are precedents for cases before the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. South Corporation v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982) In South
Corporation the Federal Circuit announced:
The adoption of precedents here announced continues the stability in
those areas of law previously within the jurisdiction of our predecessor courts.
That jurisdiction was established in great part by judges now members of this
court. The public and the bar have presumably structured their legal affairs in
accordance with that jurisprudence. To abandon it at this stage would be to
cast the court, the public, and the bar adrift on a sea of uncertainty....
As a court of nationwide geographic jurisdiction, created and chartered
with the hope and intent that stability and uniformity would be achieved in all
fields of law within its substantive jurisdiction, we begin by adopting as a basic
foundation the jurisprudence of the two national courts which served not only
as our predecessors, but as outstanding contributors to the administration of
justice for a combined total of 199 years, the Court of Claims and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals.
Id. at 1371.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals
from final decisions of the Court of International Trade. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a) (5)
(1988); STURM, supra note 1, § 34.4, at 7. In addition, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over various interlocutory appeals from the Court of
International Trade and appeals from decisions of the International Trade Commission
relating to unfair trade practices in the import trade under 19 U.S.C. § 1337. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(c) (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1), (d)(1)-(3) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5)-
(6) (1988); STURM, supra note 1 § 34.4, at 9-14.
16. 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
17. E.C. McAfee Co. v. United States, 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Brosterhous,
Coleman & Co. A/C Lurgi Chemie und Hfittentechnik GmbH v. United States, 737 F.
Supp. 1197 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990); C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. 979 (1983); C.S.D. 83-95,
17 Cust. Bull. 930 (1983); C.S.D. 83-46, 17 CusL Bull. 811 (1983); C.S.D. 81-52, 15 Cust.
Bull. 880, revoked, Customs Ruling Letter No. 542,643 (Oct. 19, 1981).
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of the transaction value of the imported merchandise only if the
first tier transaction "most directly causes" the merchandise to be
exported to the United States."' Customs rulings19 consistently
held that the second tier transaction, rather than the first tier
transaction, was the most direct cause of the exportation of the
imported merchandise to the United States.2 ° Appraising im-
ports on the basis of the second tier transaction resulted in the
U.S. importer paying higher duties because the second tier
transaction included the higher middleman price. In Nissho
Iwai, however, the Federal Circuit rejected Customs' use of a
18. C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. 979 (1983); C.S.D. 83-95, 17 Cust. Bull. 930 (1983);
C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. 811 (1983); C.S.D. 81-52, 15 Cust. Bull. 880, revoked, Cus-
toms Ruling Letter No. 542,643 (Oct. 19, 1981).
19. 19 C.F.R. § 177 (1992). A ruling is a written statement issued by Customs that
interprets and applies Customs and related laws to a particular set of facts. 19 C.F.R.
§ 177.1 (d) (1992). See SERKO, supra note 3, at 613-42 (discussing administrative rulings
by Customs).
Customs promulgated Part 177 of the Customs Regulations to enable an importer
to determine the impact of the customs and related laws on an import transaction
before the importer engages in the transaction. 19 C.F.R. § 177.1 (a) (1) (1992); SERKO,
supra note 3, at 613-14. To request a ruling on a prospective transaction, an importer
must have a direct and demonstrable interest in the question or questions presented in
the ruling request. 19 C.F.R. § 177.1(c) (1992). A request for a ruling should be in the
form of a letter. Id. § 177.2(a). Each request for a ruling should contain a complete
statement of all relevant facts relating to the transaction and a description of the trans-
action. Id. § 177.2(b).
Rulings issued under Part 177 represent the official position of Customs with re-
spect to the particular transaction or issue described in the ruling and are binding on
Customs unless they are modified or revoked. Id. § 177.9(a) (1992). Customs may
modify or revoke any ruling found to be in error or not in accordance with the current
views of Customs by giving notice to the person to whom the ruling was addressed and,
if necessary, by publishing notice of the modification or revocation in the official Cus-
toms publication, the Customs Bulletin. Id. § 177.9(d).
For example, prior to importing Ferrari automobiles, a U.S. importer may write a
letter to Customs describing the details of the proposed import transaction (i.e., the
nature of the imported merchandise, how much the importer will pay for the merchan-
dise, etc.) and ask Customs to determine the appraised value of the Ferraris and the
correct tariff rate. Customs' response is binding with regard to the transaction de-
scribed in the importer's letter to Customs. Id. § 177,9(a). Thus, a ruling enables the
importer to determine the amount of duties that will have to be paid before the im-
porter engages in the transaction.
20. C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. 979 (1983); C.S.D, 83-95, 17 Cust. Bull. 930 (1983);
C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. 811 (1983); C.S.D. 81-52, 15 Cust. Bull. 880, revoked, Cus-
toms Ruling Letter No. 542,643 (Oct. 19, 1981).
21. See supra note 11 (defining middleman as one who buys at one price and re-
sells at higher price).
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"most direct cause" test. 2 The Federal Circuit ruled that where
both transactions meet the requirements of Section 402,23 the
first tier transaction forms the basis for the transaction value of
the imported merchandise.24
This Comment argues that the Federal Circuit correctly re-
jected Customs' "most direct cause" test. Part I explains the
transaction value of the imported merchandise valuation
method and traces its legislative history. In addition, Part I re-
views Customs and prior judicial treatment of middleman im-
port transactions. Part II describes the Federal Circuit's decision
in Nissho Iwai. Part III argues that Customs' "most direct cause"
test is contrary to judicial precedent and unsupported by the leg-
islative history of Section 402. Part III also discusses the implica-
tions and limitations of Nissho Iwai for American importers. This
Comment concludes that Nissho Iwai represents a significant de-
cision in customs valuation law and U.S. importers that purchase
merchandise from non-U.S. middlemen will benefit by paying
less duties.
I. THE TRANSACTION VALUE OF IMPORTED MERCHANDISE
AND TREATMENT OF TRANSACTIONS
INVOLVING MIDDLEMEN
Under Section 402, Customs primarily25 uses the transaction
value of the imported merchandise to appraise imported mer-
chandise. 26 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its
predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, have
ruled consistently that Customs must appraise imported mer-
chandise based on a first tier transaction if that transaction
meets the statutory requirements of Section 402.27 Nonetheless,
Customs has interpreted the transaction value of the imported
merchandise as requiring transaction value to be based on the
22. Nissho Iwai American Corp. v. United States, 982 F.2d 505, 511 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
23. See supra note 7 (discussing statutory requirements of Section 402).
24. 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
25. See supra note 7 (discussing alternative Customs valuation methods).
26. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (discussing statutory basis for ap-
praisement of merchandise).
27. E.C. McAfee Co. v. United States, 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United States
v. Getz Bros. & Co., 55 C.C.P.A. 11 (1967); R.J. Saunders & Co., Inc. v. United States, 42
C.C.P.A. 55 (1954); United States v. S.S. Kresge Co., 26 C.C.P.A. 349 (1939); see supra
note 7 (discussing statutory requirements of Section 402).
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transaction that "most directly causes" the merchandise to be ex-
ported to the United States.2 1 In determining which transaction
of a two-tiered transaction constitutes the "most direct cause" of
exportation, Customs has consistently found that the second tier
transaction "most directly causes" the merchandise to be ex-
ported to the United States.'.
A. The Transaction Value of Imported Merchandise
Section 402 provides that the primary" method of calculat-
ing appraised value is the transaction value of the imported mer-
chandise."' Section 402 defines the transaction value of im-
ported merchandise as the price actually paid or payable for
merchandise when sold for exportation to the United States.3 2
While the transaction value of the imported merchandise is
based on the price paid for the merchandise, the transaction
value of the imported merchandise is not always equivalent to
the price shown on the commercial invoice. 3 Often, certain
deductions and additions to the invoiced price are required to
determine the transaction value of the imported merchandise.34
28. C.S.D. 89-30, 23 Cust. Bull. 587 (1988); C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Gust. Bull. 979 (1983);
C.S.D. 83-95, 17 Cust. Bull. 930 (1983); C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. 811 (1983); contra
C.S.D. 81-72, 15 Cust. Bull. 876 (1980), revoked, Customs Ruling Letter No. 542,643
(Oct. 19, 1981).
29. C.S.D. 89-30, 23 Cust. Bull. 587 (1988); C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. 979 (1983);
C.S.D. 83-95, 17 Cust. Bull. 930 (1983); C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. 811 (1983); contra
C.S.D. 81-72, 15 Cust. Bull. 876 (1980), revoked, Customs Ruling Letter No. 542,643
(Oct. 19, 1981).
30. See supra note 7 (discussing methods of appraising imported merchandise).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b) (1); see supra note 7 (defining preferential order of basis
for appraisement).
32. See supra note 9 (noting precise definition of transaction value of imported
merchandise).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a; see SERKO, supra note 3 at 109-25 (discussing transaction
value of imported merchandise); STuRM, supra note 1, § 47.2, at 5-28 (discussing trans-
action value of imported merchandise).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1),(3). Transaction value does not include costs in-
curred for transportation, insurance and related services that are incidental to the inter-
national and post-importation shipment of merchandise, or United States duties and
taxes levied on imported merchandise. Id. § 1401a(b) (3-4). In addition, transaction
value does not include reasonable charges for post-importation assembly or mainte-
nance. Id.
Transaction value includes certain additions to the invoice price if not already in-
cluded, such as packing charges, selling commissions, royalties, license fees, and assists.
Id. § 1401a(b)(1). Transaction value also adds to the invoiced price various benefits
that accrue to the seller, such as proceeds from post-importation resale, disposal or use
of the merchandise. Id. § 1401a(b) (1) (E).
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The following examples illustrate calculation of the transac-
tion value of imported merchandise.35 If a U.S. importer pays a
foreign manufacturer U.S.$10,000 in an arms length transaction
for a shipment of meat products, and the foreign manufacturer
does not impose any conditions or limitations upon the buyer,36
the transaction value of the meat products is U.S.$10,000.A7 If
the invoice between the foreign manufacturer and United States
importer states that the total cost of the meat products is
U.S.$10,000, with U.S.$9,000 representing the cost of the meat
products and U.S.$1,000 representing the cost of ocean freight
and insurance, the transaction value of the imported meat is
U.S.$9,000 since transaction value does not include interna-
tional freight and insurance.38
1. Legislative History of Section 402
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") is
an international agreement established in 1947 for the purpose
of reducing trade barriers and ending discriminatory treatment
in international commerce.3 9 Contracting parties to the GATT
meet regularly to negotiate reductions of trade barriers. 4° To
date, the contracting parties to the GATT have concluded seven
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations.4
Prior to the seventh round of trade negotiations, the Tokyo
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1973-1979), the
method by which countries' valued imports constituted a barrier
35. 19 C.F.R. § 152.103(a) (1), ex. 1,4 (1992).
36. See supra note 7 (discussing limits on use of transaction value of imported mer-
chandise).
37. 19 C.F.R. § 152.103(a)(1), ex. 1 (1992).
38. 19 C.F.R. § 152.103(a) (1), ex. 4 (1992); see supra note 9 (defining price paid
or payable); see also SERKO, supra note 3, at 109-25 (discussing computation of transac-
tion value of imported merchandise); STuRm, supra note 1, § 47.2, at 5-28 (discussing
computation of transaction value of imported merchandise). See generally 19 C.F.R.
§ 152.103(a) (1992) (giving examples of transaction value of imported merchandise).
39. GATT, supra note 6. STURM, supra note 1, § 62, at 1; Will Martyn, International
Trade: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 29 HARv. Irr'L L.J. 199 (1988) (herein-
after International Trade].
40. International Trade, supra note 39, at 199. Currently, there are 105 contracting
states. SwAN & MuR'uv, supra note 6, at 219. In addition, at least 20 other nations
apply the GATT to their trade relations. Id.
41. International Trade, supra note 39, at 199 n.1. An eighth round of negotiations,
the Uruguay Round, is still in progress. Keith Bradsher, The Trade Accord: Europeans
Agree with U.S. on Cutting Farm Subsidies; French Withhold Support; 2 Sides Compromise, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1992, at Al.
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to trade.42 Calculation of customs value often was used to in-
crease duties collected and to protect domestic industries.43 In
addition, the method by which contracting states valued im-
ported merchandise varied considerably." The GATT originally
required customs valuation to be calculated according to fair,
non-discriminatory rules consistent with commercial practices.45
The presence of a "grandfather clause," however, permitted con-
tracting states to calculate the value of imported merchandise
according to customs laws that did not meet the GATT's require-
ments.46
In the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the
contracting parties to the GATT negotiated, inter alia, a compre-
42. COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 52-54; S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 494
(1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 494 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 249].
43. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 42, at 494; Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 521 (1979) (Summary of Testimony, Joint Industry Group).
44. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 42, at 494; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, COMM. ON FINANCE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., AGREEMENTS BEING NEGOTIATED AT
THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA -U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COM-
MISSION INVESTIGATION No. 332-101 12 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter MTN STUDIES];
COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 52. The customs laws of most of the world's major trad-
ing countries, except the United States and Canada, calculated appraised imported
merchandise using the Brussels Definition of Value ("BDV") method. S. REP. No. 249,
supra note 42, at 494; MTN STUDIES, supra, at 12; COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 52. The
BDV was a "notional" method of determining the value of imported merchandise. The
BDV based appraised value on the price at which a product would be sold if the actual
transaction in, question were a perfectly competitive transaction. S. REP. No. 249, supra
note 42, at 494; MTN STUDIES, supra, at 12. Adjustments were made to actual price to
reach the competitive price, often resulting in increased tariff liability. S. REP. No. 249,
supra note 42, at 494; MTN STUDIES, supra, at 12. In addition, countries interpreted
BDV provisions differently, resulting in inconsistent application of the BDV method.
COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 53; REPORT BY THE DIRECroR-GENERAL OF GATT, THE
TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 69 (1979).
Canadian customs law based appraised value on the "fair market value" of the im-
ported goods. MTN STUDIES, supra, at 14. Canadian customs law defined the "fair
market value" of the imported goods as the price of similar goods when sold for home
consumption in the country of exportation. Id. Thus, Canadian customs law used the
time of exportation and the place from which the goods were shipped directly to Can-
ada in determining appraised value. Id.
U.S. customs law provided for nine alternative methods of valuing imported mer-
chandise.
U.S. goals in the MTN with respect to customs valuation were to provide a "posi-
tive" standard of customs valuation, i.e., one that based appraised value on the transac-
tion value and to provide a "transparent" standard, i.e., one that would be more predict-
able. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 42, at 495; COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 51.
45. COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 52.
46. Id.
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hensive customs valuation code (the "GATT Valuation Code").47
The GATT Valuation Code established that the preferred
method of calculating appraised value is the transaction value of
the imported merchandise.48 The GATT Valuation Code de-
fined the transaction value of the imported merchandise as the
price paid or payable for the merchandise when sold for expor-
tation to the country of importation.49 In 1979, Congress en-
acted the Trade Agreements Act (the "TAX") to implement the
GATT Valuation Code.5"
Prior to U.S. adherence to the GATT Valuation Code, U.S.
customs law required Customs to calculate appraised value ac-
cording to the export value of the imported merchandise. 5 Sec-
47. AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VII OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,402 [hereinafter GATT VALUATION
CODE]; COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 51; S. REP. No. 96-249, supra note 42, at 494. See
RossIEs, supra note 6, at 111-12 (discussing adoption of GAIT Valuation Agreement);
SERKO, supra note 3, at 107-108 (discussing adoption of GATT Valuation Agreement);
Reflections, supra note 14, at 119-20 (examining goals in adopting GAIT Valuation
Agreement, highlighting intriguing provisions, and identifying questions and problems
left unresolved by negotiators).
48. GAT, art. vii, supra note 6, 55 U.N.T.S. at 216-18.
49. Id. arts. i, viii, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-200, 218-20.
50. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 201, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1980);
.STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 6, at 463; S. REP. No. 249, supra note
42, at 108; H. REP. No. 96-317,96th Cong., 1st Sess., (1979) (hereinafter H. REP. No. 96-
317]. In enacting the Trade Agreements Act, Congress stated the general rule that
appraised value under Section 402 will be determined on the basis of information read-
ily available in the United States. STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 6,
at 456.
51. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401a, 1402, amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1980); ROSSIDES, supra note 6, at 132-38. More precisely, prior
to adoption of the GATT Valuation Code, U.S. customs valuation law consisted of two
statutes: 19 U.S.C. § 1401a and 19 U.S.C. § 1402. Id. Determining which Customs used
in calculating appraised value depended upon the article being appraised. T.D. 54521,
93 Treas. Dec. 14 (1958). Approximately 86% of all customs entries were valued under
19 U.S.C. § 1401a. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 42, at 498.
Under the pre-1979 version of 19 U.S.C. § 1401a, the primary method of apprais-
ing imported merchandise was export value. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a, amended by Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Star. 144 (1980). If the export value
could not be calculated, Customs used the U.S. value of the imported merchandise to
calculate appraised value. Id. § 1401a(a) (2). The U.S. value was the price at the time
of exportation at which such or similar merchandise was freely sold or offered for sale
in the principal market of the United States for domestic consumption, packed ready
for delivery, in the usual wholesale quantities, and in the ordinary course of trade. Id.
§ 1401a(c). In calculating U.S. value, Customs deducted commissions paid, any
amount usually added for general expenses and profit, usual expenses from the place
of shipment to the place of delivery, and ordinary customs duties and federal excise and
other taxes. Id. § 1401a(c)(1)-(3). If neither the export value nor the U.S. value of the
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tion 402 defined export value as the price in the country of ex-
portation at which merchandise similar to the imported mer-
chandise is sold or offered for sale for exportation to the United
imported merchandise could be found, Customs used the constructed value of the im-
ported merchandise to calculate appraised value. Id. § 1401a(a) (3). The constructed
value was the sum of the cost of materials and of the fabrication and or other process-
ing employed in producing such or similar merchandise prior to exportation, plus an
amount for general expenses and profit equal to that usually reflected in sales of the
merchandise and for the cost of containers, coverings and packing for shipment to the
United States. Ld. § 1401a(d). In addition, under the pre-1979 version of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1401a, Congress selected certain merchandise to be appraised on the basis of the
American Selling Price, rather than the above methods of valuation. Id. § 1401a(a) (4).
The American Selling Price was the price, including the cost of containers, coverings
and packing, at which an article manufactured or produced in the United States was
freely sold or offered for sale for domestic consumption in the United States or the
price that the owner would have been willing to receive for such merchandise at the
time of exportation of the imported article. Id. § 1401a(e).
Under the pre-1979 version of 19 U.S.C. § 1402, the primary method of calculating
appraised value was the foreign value or the export value, whichever is higher. 19
U.S.C. § 1402, amended &y Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144
(1980). The foreign value was the price at which merchandise was sold for home con-
sumption at the time of exportation of the merchandise to the United States, plus
amounts equal to the cost of readying the merchandise for shipment. Id. § 14 02(c).
The export value was the market value or the price at the time of exportation at which
the merchandise was freely offered for sale to the United States. Id. § 1402(d). If
neither the foreign value nor the export value could be found, Customs appraised the
imported merchandise using the U.S. value of the imported merchandise. Id.
§ 1402(a) (2). The U.S. value was the price at which the imported merchandise is freely
offered for sale for domestic consumption, with an allowance for duty, costs of transpor-
tation and insurance, other necessary expenses from the place of shipment to the place
of delivery, and a commission not exceeding six percent of goods acquired other than
by purchase, or, if purchased, profits not to exceed eight percent and a reasonable
allowance for general expenses not to exceed eight percent. Id. § 1402(e). If none of
the three above values could be found, Customs appraised imported merchandise ac-
cording to the cost of production of the imported merchandise. Id. § 1402 (a) (3). The
cost of production was defined as the total cost of materials and the work done on those
materials in manufacturing or producing such or similar merchandise prior to the date
of exportation, plus.the usual general expenses (not less than ten percent), the cost of
containers, coverings, packing, and other costs for putting the merchandise into condi-
tion ready for shipment to the United States, and an addition for ordinary profit of not
less than eight percent of the total amount for the cost of materials and of fabrication
and the usual general expenses. Id. § 1402(f). Finally, under 19 U.S.C. § 1402, Con-
gress selected certain merchandise to be appraised on the basis of the American Selling
Price, rather than the above methods of valuation. Id. § 1402(a) (4). The American
Selling Price was the price, including the cost of containers, coverings and packing, at
which an article manufactured or produced in the United States was freely sold or of-
fered for sale for domestic consumption in the United States or the price that the
owner would have been willing to receive for such merchandise at the time of exporta-
tion of the imported article. Id. § 1402(g).
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States.5 2 Thus, determining export value under Section 402 re-
quired Customs to determine what constitutes a sale for exporta-
tion to the United States.53 In replacing the export value
method with the transaction value of the imported merchandise
method, however, Congress failed to indicate which sale sets the
transaction value where more than one sale qualifies as one for
exportation to the United States. 4
Export value differs from the transaction value of the im-
ported merchandise in two significant aspects. 5 First, export
value bases valuation on the price of the merchandise at the time
of exportation.56 Transaction value, by contrast, bases valuation
on the price of the merchandise at the time of the transaction. 7
Second, export value bases valuation on the price associated with
the usual wholesale quantities. 58 Transaction value, on the other
hand, bases valuation on the price associated with the actual
52. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a, amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
39, 93 Stat. 144 (1980); ROSSIDES, supra note 6, at 133. More precisely, export value
under 19 U.S.C. § 1401a was defined as:
the price, at the time of exportation to the United States of the merchandise
undergoing appraisement, at which such or similar merchandise is freely sold
or, in the absence of sales, offered for sale in the principal markets of the
country of exportation, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary
course of trade, for exportation to the United States, plus, when not included
in such price, the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature and
all other expenses incidental to placing the merchandise in condition, packed
ready for shipment to the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 1401a, amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat.
144 (1980). Export value under 19 U.S.C. § 1402 was defined as:
the market value or the price, at the time of exportation of such merchandise
to the United States, at which such or similar merchandise is freely offered for
sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which ex-
ported, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade,
for exportation to the United States, plus, when not included in such price,
the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature, and all other costs,
charges, and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition,
packed ready for shipment to the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 1402, amended by Trade Agreement Act of 1979, amended by, Pub. L. No. 96-
39, 93 Stat. 144 (1980).
53. See supra note 52 (quoting definition of export value).
54. See Reflections, supra note 14, at 144.
55. ADVISORY COMMITrEE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE
CONGRESS AND THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 22 (1979).
56. Id.
57. See supra note 7 (defining transaction value of imported merchandise).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a, amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
39, 93 Stat. 144 (1980); 19 U.S.C. § 1402, amended by Trade Agreement Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1980); STURM, supra note 1, § 47.1, at 1.
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quantity involved in the transaction.59
B. Customs and Judicial Treatment of Transactions
Involving Middlemen
In resolving Section 402's ambiguity, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and its predecessor court, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, ruled that Customs must base ap-
praised value on a first tier transaction if that transaction meets
the requirements of Section 402.60 Nonetheless, Customs and
the Court of International Trade61 interpreted Section 402 to
allow appraised value to be based on the first tier transaction
only if the first tier transaction was the "most direct cause" of the
exportation of the merchandise to the United States. 62
1. Customs' Rulings
Prior to Nissho Iwai, Customs policy for determining the ap-
praised value of an import transaction involving middlemen was
clear.63 Customs based transaction value on the transaction that
"most directly caused" the merchandise to be exported to the
59. See supra note 7 (defining transaction value of imported merchandise).
60. United States v. Getz Bros. & Co., 55 C.C.P.A. 11 (1967); R.J. Saunders & Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 42 C.C.P.A. 55 (1954); United States v. S.S. Kresge Co., 26 C.C.P.A.
349 (1939); see supra note 7 (discussing statutory requirements of Section 402).
61. Hon. Edward D. Re, Litigation Before the United States Court of International Trade,
19 U.S.C.A. xi, xiv (West Supp. 1993). The Court of International Trade is a court of
national jurisdiction established under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Id. The
Court of International Trade consists of nine judges appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. at xiv; 28 U.S.C. § 251 (a) (1988). Pursuant to
the Customs Court Act of 1980, the Court of International Trade has jurisdiction over
civil actions arising from adverse agency actions arising out of import transactions. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1581-1585 (1988); Re, supra, at xvi. The Court of International Trade has all
powers in law and equity or as conferred by statute upon a federal district court, as well
as power to render money judgments for and against the United States, to order retri-
als, rehearings, or remands for further administrative hearings, and to fashion whatever
relief is appropriate in a particular case, including the power to issue injunctions, writs
of mandamus, and declaratoryjudgments. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1585, 2643 (1988); Re, supra, at
xviii. Private parties and Customs may appeal decisions of the Court of International
Trade to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See STuRM, supra note 1, §§ 30-32
(discussing judicial review of Customs' action and United States Court of International
Trade).
62. C.S.D. 89-30, 23 Cust. Bull. 587 (1988); C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. 979 (1983);
C.S.D. 83-95, 17 Cust. Bull. 930 (1983); C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. 811 (1983); contra
C.S.D. 81-72, 15 Cust. Bull. 876 (1980), revoked, Customs Ruling Letter No. 542,643
(Oct. 19, 1981).
63. C.S.D. 89-30, 23 Cust. Bull. 587 (1988); C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. 979 (1983);
C.S.D. 83-95, 17 Cust. Bull. 930 (1983); C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. 811 (1983); contra
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United States."4 In utilizing a "most direct cause" test, Customs
consistently found that the transaction between the middleman
and the United States importer (i.e., the second tier transaction)
was the "most direct cause" of the importation.65In the seminal Customs ruling on middleman pricing, Cus-
toms Service Decision ("C.S.D.") 83-46,66 Customs held that
when two or more transactions qualify as sales for exportation to
the United States, the transaction to which the phrase "when
sold for exportation to the United States" refers is the transac-
tion which "most directly causes" the merchandise to be ex-
ported to the United States. 67 C.S.D. 83-46 involved a British Vir-
gin Islands corporation ("BVI Corporation") acting as a'middle-
man in the sale of cooking apparatus from a Far East
manufacturer to a U.S. customer.68 BVI Corporation planned to
contract for production of the cooking apparatus with an Asian
manufacturer that would produce. the cooking apparatus accord-
ing to specifications provided by BVI Corporation. 69 The Asian
manufacturer would then ship the goods to BVI Corporation's
U.S. customer.7 ° Customs ruled that the transaction that "most
directly caused" the exportation of the cooking apparatus to the
United States was the sale from BVI Corporation to the U.S.
branch.7'
C.S.D. 81-72, 15 Cust. Bull. 876 (1980), revoked, Customs Ruling Letter No. 542,643
(Oct. 19, 1981).
64. C.S.D. 89-30, 23 Cust. Bull. 587 (1988); C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. 979 (1983);
C.S.D. 83-95, 17 Cust. Bull. 930 (1983); C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. 811 '(1983); contra
C.S.D. 81-72, 15 Cust. Bull. 876 (1980), revoked, Customs Ruling Letter No. 542,643
(Oct. 19, 1981).
65. C.S.D. 89-30, 23 Cust. Bull. 587 (1988); C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. 979 (1983);
C.S.D. 83-95, 17 Cust. Bull. 930 (1983); C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. 811 (1983); contra
CS.D. 8i-72, 15 Cust. Bull. 880 (1980), revoked, Customs Ruling Letter No. 542,643
(Oct. 19, 1981).
,66. T.D. 78-414, 12 Cust. Bull. 920 (1978). Customs Service Decisions are pub-
lished Customs rulings. Id. Published Customs rulings are those rulings deemed to be
of precedential value. 19 C.F.R. § 177.10 (1992). Precedential rulings are published in
the Customs Bulletin within 120 days of their issuance. Id. Unlike regular rulings,
which are binding only with regard to the specific transaction described in the ruling,
Customs Service Decisions are binding on Customs as to all importers with similar trans-
actions. Id.
67. C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. 811 (1983).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 812.
71. Id. Customs stated:
In regard to the [Trade Agreements Act of 1979], it is the position of the
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Similarly, in C.S.D. 83-95, Customs appraised imported
goods based on a sale between a Hong Kong middleman and the
U.S. importer.72 The U.S. importer ordered custom-made shirts
from a Hong Kong middleman who, in turn, ordered and
purchased the shirts from a manufacturer in the People's Re-
public of China.73 The Hong Kong middleman then resold the
shirts to the U.S. importer.74 Citing C.S.D. 83-46, Customs held
that the contract for sale between the Hong Kong middleman
and the U.S. importer was the transaction that "most directly
caused" the goods to be exported to the United States. 75
Finally, in C.S.D. 84-54, Customs again calculated transac-
tion value based on a sale between the middleman and the U.S.
importer.76 In C.S.D. 84-54, an English middleman planned to
enter into an agreement with a Salvadoran shoe manufacturer
for the purchase of shoes that would be shipped directly from El
Customs Service that the transaction to which the phrase "when sold for ex-
portation to the United States" refers when there are two or more transactions
which might give rise to a transaction value, is the transaction which most
directly causes the merchandise to be exported to the United States.
In the circumstances described above, the sale from the manufacturers to
[BVI corporation] does not cause the goods to be exported to the United
States. The goods are not shipped as a result of this sale. The transaction that
most directly causes their actual exportation is the sale from [BVI corporation
to the U.S. customer). Therefore, it is this sale to which we must look for a
transaction value.
Id. at 813.
Although Customs found that the sale between BVI and the United States branch
is the sale relevant to transaction value, Customs held that the transaction value of the
imported merchandise was not the proper basis of appraisement since insufficient in-
formation was available to determine proceeds due BVI from subsequent resale ar-
rangements. Id.
72. C.S.D. 83-95, 17 Cust. Bull. 930 (1983).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Customs reasoned:
We . .. disagree with the view that the sale from (middleman) to the
importer did not occur until the merchandise reached Hong Kong. In our
view, the importer's purchase order and its acceptance by (middleman) con-
stituted a contract for the sale of future goods, title to which passed to the
importer when the goods were placed on board the vessel in Hong Kong. The
merchandise was not resold while in transit to the U.S. Rather, the transfer of
title to the importer was in furtherance of the preexisting contract to sell.
That contract and the transfer of title to the importer were the "transaction"
which most directly caused the goods to be exported to the United States.
Id. at 932.
76. C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. 979 (1983)
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Salvador to a U.S. importer." The U.S. importer argued that
the contract between the English middleman and the Salvado-
ran shoe manufacturer was the "most direct cause" of the expor-
tation of the shoes to the United States.78 Citing C.S.D. 83-46,
Customs rejected the U.S. importer's contention, holding that
the sale between the English middleman and the U.S. customer
would be the sale that "most directly caused" the shoes to be
exported to the United States.79 Customs explained that using
the transaction between the English middleman and the U.S. im-
porter conforms with the legislative history of Section 402, which
supports basing appraised value on information readily available
in the United States.8 ° Customs reasoned that calculating ap-
praised value based on the transaction between the middleman
and the Salvadoran manufacturer would require use of informa-
tion derived primarily from non-U.S. sources.8 "
2. The Court of International Trade Adopts the "Most Direct
Cause" Test
In Brosterhous Coleman & Co. A/C Lurgi Chemie und Hiit-
tentechnik GmbH v. United States,82 the Court of International
Trade ruled that the transaction value of the imported merchan-
dise should be based on the transaction that "most directly
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Customs explained:
The Statement of Administrative Action relating to section 402 of the
[Trade Agreements Act of 1979] provides that "As a general rule, the Customs
value determined under proposed section 402 will be on the basis of informa-
tion readily available in the United States." We believe that our interpretation
of the words "when sold for exportation to the United States" set forth in
[C.S.D. 83-46] conforms to the above-stated intention since it generally results
in our basing transaction value on information available in the United States.
In contrast to this result, a determination that the above-quoted phrase refers
to the transaction between the foreign manufacturer and the second foreign
company would require transaction value to be based on information derived
primarily from foreign sources.
Therefore, applying our holding in [C.S.D. 83-46] to the facts in this case,
it is clear that the transaction which most directly causes the shoes to be ex-
ported from El Salvador to the United States is the sale from the English com-
pany, A, to the purchaser in the United States, D.
Id. at 980.
80. Id.; see supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history
of Section 402).
81. C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. 979, 980 (1983).
82. 737 F. Supp. 1197 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990).
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causes" the exportation to the United States.8" Crown
Zellerbach Corp. ("Crown"), a U.S. producer of paper, con-
tracted with Lurgi Chemie und Huttentechnik GmbH ("Lurgi"),
a German corporation, for the design, fabrication, and supervi-
sion of the construction of a chlorine dioxide bleach plant at
Crown's paper-making facility in Camas, Washington."4 The
contract between Crown and Lurgi did not specify which ven-
dors would supply the necessary components or even where the
components would be purchased. 5 Lurgi bought the compo-
nents from a German manufacturer.86 Brosterhous Coleman &
Co., a U.S. corporation, imported the equipment into the
United States on behalf of Lurgi. 7 Customs appraised the im-
ported components based on the transaction between Crown
and Lurgi, not the transaction between Lurgi and the non-U.S.
manufacturer."
In determining which transaction represented the transac-
tion value of the imported merchandise, the Court of Interna-
tional Trade adopted Customs' rule that when more than one
transaction qualifies as a sale for exportation to the United
States, the transaction value should be based on the transaction
that "most directly causes" the merchandise to be exported to
the United States. 9 The court found, however, that unlike prior
customs service decisions in which the contracts at issue contem-
plated the importation of merchandise, 90 the contract between
83. Id. at 1199; see supra note 61 (discussing role of Court of International Trade).
84. 737 F. Supp. at 1198.
85. Id. The contract contained the following clause:
The compensation indicated above .. . is understood to be for delivery of
equipment and the engineering package c.i.f. Camas, Washington, including
adequate packing as necessary, unloading not included. Customs duties up to
3.5% applying customs tariff No. 661.67 covering pulp paper machinery is also
included. All other taxes, fees or expenses payable in the U.S.A. shall be paid
and borne by Buyer.
Id. at 1199.
The court rejected Customs' assertion that the above clause required that the mer-
chandise be imported. Id. Instead, the court found that the clause meant that the
seller would be responsible only for duties up to 3.5% of the contract price. Id.
86. Id. at 1198.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1199.
89. Id. at 1200.
90. C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. 979 (1983); C.S.D. 83-95, 17 Cust. Bull. 930 (1983);
C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. 811 (1983); C.S.D. 81-72, 15 Cust. Bull. 880 (1980), revoked,
Customs Ruling Letter No. 542,643 (Oct. 19, 1981)..
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Crown and Lurgi did not require importation of merchandise.9'
The court concluded that the contract was not the "most direct
cause" of the exportation to the United States and that Customs
incorrectly appraised the imported merchandise based on the
contract.
92
3. Federal Circuit and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
Decisions on Transactions Involving Middlemen
Prior to Nissho Iwai, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals, analyzed whether the non-U.S. manufacturer's
price associated with the first tier transaction may constitute the
basis of appraisement. 93 Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
decisions rendered before the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
91. Brosterhous, 737 F. Supp. at 1200. Judge, now ChiefJudge, DiCarlo, reasoned:
The determinations upon which the government relies to support its posi-
tion that the contract between Crown and Lurgi is the sale which most directly
caused the exportation are inapposite. In C.S.D. 84-54, a United States com-
pany entered into a contract to purchase shoes from an English company that,
in turn, purchased the shoes from a manufacturer in El Salvador. The manu-
facturer in El Salvador was to ship the merchandise directly to the United
States. C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. at 979. In C.S.D. 83-95, a United States
company ordered shirts from a supplier in Hong Kong who would deliver
them to the buyer in Hong Kong. The distributor purchased the merchandise
from a manufacturer in the People's Republic of China. C.S.D. 83-95, 17 Cust.
Bull, at 931. See also CLA-2 CO:R.CV:V 542928 BLS, TAA #57 (Jan. 21, 1983)
(sale by Virgin Island distributor of cooking equipment manufactured in Asia
to United States buyer).
In each instance, Customs determined that the sale for exportation was
the transaction between the United States customer and the foreign distribu-
tor. See C.S.D. 84-54, 18 Cust. Bull. at 980; C.S.D. 83-95, 17 Cust. Bull. at 932;
TAA #57 at 3. In each case, however, the contract with the United States pur-
chaser contemplated that the merchandise would be imported.
Id.; see supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text (discussing Customs rulings on middle-
man pricing).
92. Id. Judge DiCarlo, found:
W.. hen there is more than one sale for exportation, Customs policy is
that transaction value should be calculated according to the sale which most
directly caused the merchandise to be exported to the United States ....
... [T]he Court finds that the transaction between Crown and Lurgi was
not the sale for exportation that most directly caused the merchandise to be
exported to the United States. The transactions between Lurgi and its vendors
are, therefore, the sales for exportation for purposes of calculating transaction
value under 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b) (1988).
Id. at 1199-1200.
93. E.C. McAfee Co. v. United States, 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United States
v. Getz Bros. & Co., 55 C.C.P.A. 11 (1967); R.J. Saunders & Co., Inc. v. United States, 42
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("TAA") consistently held that there was no need to consider the
second tier transaction in calculating appraised value if the price
associated with the first tier transaction also satisfied the statu-
tory requirements of Section 402.9 4 The sole decision by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rendered subsequent to
the enactment of the TAA concurred that there was no need to
consider the second tier transaction in calculating appraised
value if the first tier transaction meets the elements of Section
402.95
a. Decisions Rendered Prior to Enactment of the TAA
In United States v. S.S. Kresge Co. ,96 the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals established that the price associated -with a first
tier transaction may serve as the basis for appraisement under
Section 402 of the Tariff Act of 1930."' In S.S. Kresge Co., a U.S.
importer purchased Christmas tree ornaments from a German
middleman who had purchased the ornaments from several Ger-
man manufacturers. 98 Customs contended that the manufactur-
ers' price was not the proper basis of appraisement since that
price was not available to other purchasers.99 Thus, Customs ar-
gued that the ornaments should be appraised on the higher
middleman's price associated with the second tier transaction. 100
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected Customs' ar-
gument and found that the record contained substantial evi-
dence that the price was available to other purchasers. 10 1 Thus,
the court held that the German manufacturers' price was the
C.C.P.A. 55 (1954); United States v. S.S. Kresge Co., 26 C.C.P.A. 349 (1939); see supra
note 15 (describing jurisdiction of Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
94. United States v. Getz Bros. & Co., 55 C.C:P.A. 11 (1967); R.J. Saunders & Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 42 C.C.P.A. 55 (1954); United States v. S.S. Kresge Co., 26 C.C.P.A.
349 (1939); see supra note 7 (discussing statutory requirements of Section 402).
95. E.C. McAfee Co. v. United States, 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see supra note
7 (discussing statutory requirements of Section 402)..
96. 26 C.C.P.A. 349 (1939).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 350-51.
99. Id. at 351-52. Section 402(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930 required that the mer-
chandise be sold or offered for sale in the ordinary course of trade in the principal
markets of the exporting country for exportation to the United States. 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1401a, 1402; see supra note 52 (discussing requirements of export value).
100. 26 C.C.P.A. at 351-52.
101. Id. at 352; see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing require-
ments of export value).
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proper basis of appraisement even though the price associated
with the second tier transaction also satisfied the statutory re-
quirements of Section 402.102
In RJ. Saunders & Co., Inc. v. United States,' the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals again ruled that the middleman's
price associated with the second tier transaction cannot be used
as the basis of appraisement if the manufacturer's price qualifies
under Section 402.1°4 The court in RJ. Saunders considered
whether a resale restriction requiring Canadian middlemen to
export meat paste disqualified the first tier transaction from
forming the basis of export value.10 5 The resale restriction im-
posed in the first tier transaction prevented the Canadian mid-
dlemen from selling the canned meat paste in Canada, requiring
the middlemen to export the canned meat paste. 10 6 The court
ruled that the restriction requiring exportation included expor-
tation to the United States."0 7 Therefore, the manufacturer's
price could be the basis of export value."' 8 The court indicated
that export value need not be determined solely on the basis of
sales to U.S. importers.10 9
Finally, in United States v. Getz Bros. & Co., 11 the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals adhered to the principle set forth
in S.S. Kresge and held that if a manufacturer and a middleman's
price each meet the statutory standards for export value, Cus-
toms must appraise the merchandise using the manufacturer's
102. 26 C.C.P.A. at 352.
103. 42 C.C.P.A. 55 (1954).
104. Id.; see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of
export value).
105. 42 C.C.P.A. at 56-57; see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing
requirements of export value).
106. 42 C.C.P.A. at 57.
107. Id. at 59. The court stated:
Under the ... language of the statute, the transactions between the Canadian
manufacturer and [Canadian middlemen] cannot be deemed to be controlled
sales in the sense that the limitation imposed thereon should operate in dero-
gation of the establishment of a freely offered price for export to the United
States.
Id. at 59-60.
108. Id.; see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of
export value).
109. 42 C.C.P.A. at 60.
110. 55 C.C.P.A. 11 (1967).
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price."' Customs contended that the prices charged by Japa-
nese plywood manufacturers to Japanese middlemen did not
meet the statutory requirements for export value because the
Japanese middlemen were not required to export the ply-
wood.'1 2 Rejecting Customs' position, the court held that sub-
stantial evidence existed that the sales between the manufactur-
ers and middlemen were sales for exportation to the United
States.'
3
b. Middleman Pricing After Enactment of the TAA-E. C.
McAfee Co. v. United States
In E.C. McAfee Co. v. United States,' t 4 the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ruled that Customs incorrectly appraised
imported made-to-measure clothing based on the price paid by
the importer to a middleman in the second tier transaction." 5
The importer of record in McAfee was American Air Parcel For-
warding Company, Ltd. ("AAP"), a freight forwarder for Hong
Kong clothing distributors that sold clothing to U.S. custom-
ers." 6 Sales representatives of the Hong Kong distributors solic-
ited orders in the United States from U.S. customers.' 7 In addi-
tion, retail shops in Hong Kong solicited orders from U.S. tour-
ists."" Upon receiving an order, the sales representatives and
retail stores forwarded the order to the Hong Kong distribu-
111. Id.; see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of
export value).
112. 55 C.C.P.A. at 19-20; see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing
requirements of export value).
113. 55 C.C.P.A. at 20. Getz Bros. & Co. arose as a result of Japanese export quota
and licensing requirements, that limited the amount of plywood which could be ex-
ported to various countries. Id. at 13. In 1955, decline in the price of plywood, due
primarily to excess production capacity, caused the Japanese government to impose a
quota and export licensing system. Id. The Japanese government assigned quotas to
Japanese manufacturers of plywood, as well as to middlemen dealing in Japanese ply-
wood, that limited the amount of plywood that could be exported. Id. The govern-
ment enforced the quota system by requiring exporters to obtain export licenses from
the government. Id. at 14. Exporters could not obtain an export license unless they
had quota. Id.
114. 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text
(describing enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979).
115. 842 F.2d at 315.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 315-16.
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tors."1 9 The Hong Kong distributors, in turn, contracted with
tailors in Hong Kong for production of the clothing.1 20  The
tailors performed a "cut, make, and trim" operation.1 2 1 After re-
ceiving the manufactured clothing from the tailors, the Hong
Kong distributors delivered the clothing to AAP for transport to
the United States. 122
The Federal Circuit determined that the transaction be-
tween the Hong Kong manufacturer and the Hong Kong mid-
dleman, the first tier transaction, was a sale for exportation to
the United States because the goods made by the Hong Kong
manufacturer were clearly destined for the United States. 12 As a
result, the importer was entitled to the benefit of valuation based
on the first tier transaction between the Hong Kong manufac-
turer and Hong Kong middleman even though Customs' valua-
tion, based on the second tier transaction between the Hong
Kong middleman and U.S. importer, also satisfied the statutory
requirements of Section 402.124 The court reasoned that cases
decided prior to the 1979 enactment of the TAA 125 supported
119. Id. at 315.
120. Id. at 316.
121. Id. The tailors cut the fabric, sewed the cut parts together, and supplied the
garments' trim. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 319. The court stated:
We conclude that the tailors' actual knowledge that the particular suits
are destined for the United States is irrelevant. Where clothing is made-to-
measure for individual United States customers and ultimately sent to those
customers, the reality of the transaction between the distributors and the
tailors is that the goods, at the time of the transaction between the distributor
and tailors, are "for exportation to the United States." Apart from this factor,
there is no dispute that the merchandise was being made for export to the
United States. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's finding to the con-
trary is clearly erroneous ....
The merchandise at issue is unique in that, from the time of the initial
contact until eventual importation, the goods in question were being made for
a specific United States consumer, not the United States market generally.
That should not be taken to mean that only goods tailor-made for a United
States individual are goods clearly destined for the [sic] exportation to the
United States, but rather that is, in this case, the factor which compels a reversal
of the finding that the goods were not for exportation to the United States at
the time of assembly.
Id.
124. Id. at 318-19; see supra note 7 (discussing statutory requirements of Section
402).
125. United States v. Getz Bros. & Co., 55 C.C.P.A. 11 (1967); R.J. Saunders & Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 42 C.C.P.A. 55 (1954); United States v. S.S. Kresge Co., 26 C.C.P.A.
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the court's holding that the price charged by the Hong Kong
manufacturers provided the proper basis for appraising the mer-
chandise. 12
6
One month after the Federal Circuit's holding in McAfee,
however, Customs issued a ruling that limited the availability of
the benefits of McAfee to U.S. importers. 27  In Ruling No.
544,179, Customs indicated its position that the holding of Mc-
Afee is limited to factual situations identical to those of McAfee.128
Thus, only importers of made-to-measure clothing, where the
manufacturer of the clothing and middleman were located in
the same country, could benefit by McAfee's holding. 29
349 (1939); see supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text (describing enactment of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979).
126. E.C. McAfee, 842 F.2d at 318. The court reasoned:
[Section 402] provides that transaction value is based on the price for the
merchandise "when sold for exportation to the United States." In United States
v. Getz Bros. & Co., 55 C.C.PA. 11 (1967), a precedential decision of the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, a similar, three-tiered, distribution situation
was presented. While the Getz case was decided under 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b) as
it appeared before amendment by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the lan-
guage of the earlier statute is not significantly different from the quoted provi-
sion of the current statute. The issue in Get; was whether valuation of certain
plywood should be at the manufacturer's price to a foreign middleman or that
middleman's price to the United States customer. Two holdings in that case
are significant here. First, a sale need not be to purchasers located in the
United States to provide the basis for valuation. Second, if the transaction
between the manufacturer and the middleman falls within the statutory provi-
sion for valuation, the manufacturer's price, rather than the price from the
middleman to his customer, is used for appraisal.
Id. (citing United States v. Getz Bros. & Co., 55 C.C.P.A. 11, 18 (1967); R.J. Saunders &
Co. v. United States, 42 C.C.P.A. 55, 59 (1954); United States v. S.S. Kresge Co., 26
C.C.P.A. 349, 352 (1939); Rodriguez v. United States, 23 Cust. Ct. 296, 300 (1949)).
127. Customs Ruling Letter No. 544,179 (Apr. 1, 1988).
128. Id. at 2. Customs stated:
[I] t is Headquarter's position that the holding of [McAfee] is clearly limited by
the language of the court to the facts which are preculiar [sic] to [McAfee]. This
approach is required not only because of the commercial circumstances
before the court but also by the difficulties implicit in determinations regard-
ing the term "assembly" under these circumstances. Accordingly, insofar as
Headquarters is concerned, the principles set forth within [McAfee] should
only be applied with regard to the importation of made-to-measure clothing
when the distributor and tailor are located in the same country. Further, all
field offices should be satisfied that the clothing involved is in fact made-to-
measure.
Id.
129. Id.
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II. NISSHO IWAI AMERICAN CORP. v. UNITED STATES
In Nissho Iwai American Corp. v. United States,130 the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit analyzed whether Customs
should appraise imported merchandise based on a Japanese
middleman's price associated with a second tier transaction,
rather than a Japanese manufacturer's price associated with a
first tier transaction. 13' The Federal Circuit concluded that
where both the Japanese manufacturer's price and the Japanese
middleman's price are statutorily viable transaction values, 132 the
Japanese manufacturer's price provides the basis for determin-
ing transaction value.' 3 3 Moreover, the Federal Circuit rejected
using a "most direct cause" test to determine which of two viable
transactions may be used to determine transaction value.'3 4
A. Facts and Procedural History
The importer in Nissho Iwai, the Metropolitan Transporta-
tion Authority of New York City ("MTA"), purchased 325 rapid
transit passenger cars pursuant to a contract with Nissho Iwai
American Corporation ("NIAC").' 35 The MTA paid NIAC
U.S.$844,500 per passenger car. 36 The contract provided for
the production of the passenger cars in Japan by a third party,
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. ("KHI") .13  The contract also
obligated KHI to use U.S. propulsion and brake systems. 38
NIAC assigned its rights and obligations under the contract to its
parent corporation, Nissho Iwai Corporation ("NIC"), on the
same day NIAC executed the contract with the MTA. 1
9
NIC entered into a contract with KHI for production of the
130. 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
131. Id. at 511.
132. See supra note 7 (discussing statutory requirements of Section 402).
133. 982 F.2d at 511; see supra note 7 (discussing statutory requirements of Section
402).
134. 982 F.2d at 511.
135. Id. at 506.
136. Id.
137. Id. KHI worked with NIAC's parent corporation, Nissho Iwai Corporation, in
placing the bid for the contract. 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 644, 645, rev'd, 982 F.2d 505 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). KHI signed a warranty of performance to MTA and to NIAC on the same
day that NIAC signed the contract with MTA. Id.
138. 15 Ct. Int'l Trade at 645, rev'd, 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
139. 982 F.2d at 506.
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passenger cars. 4° NIC and KHI agreed to be jointly responsible
for the quality of the cars.1 4 1 KHI agreed to provide technical
assistance following delivery of the passenger cars. 1 42 KHI also
agreed to deliver the'passenger cars to NIC, free on board, to
Kobe, Japan. 4 3 NIC paid KHI approximately U.S.$331,300 per
passenger car.1
4 4
NIAC imported the passenger cars into the United States in
sixteen entries145 from 1983 to 1985.146 In the first eleven en-
tries, Customs appraised the passenger cars on the basis of the
lower price provided for in the KHI contract.'4 7 In the remain-
ing five entries, however, Customs appraised the passenger cars
based on the higher price provided for in the MTA contract.'
4
NIAC protested 149 Customs' appraisement of the value of
140. Id. KHI manufactured the passenger cars specifically for sale to MTA; the
passenger cars could not be used for any other purpose. Id. at 506-7.
141. 15 Ct. Int'l Trade at 646, rev'd, 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
142. Id.
143. 982 F.2d at 507.
144. Id. ¥80,002,100 converted to U.S. currency at 241.50 yen per dollar. Foreign
Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1982, Business, at D12.
145. See supra note 2 (defining entry).
146. 982 F.2d at 507.
147. Id.
148. Id. Customs deducted a total of U.S.$347,355.32 from the contract price of
each passenger car for various nondutiable costs, charges, and payments associated with
the price paid by MTA to NIC. Id. n.5. For vehicles entered in 1983, Customs ap-
praised the vehicles at U.S.$497,737.61. Id. at 507. For passenger cars entered in 1984,
Customs appraised the passenger cars at U.S.$500,495.16. Id. For vehicles entered in
1985, Customs appraised the vehicles at U.S.$503,751.17. Id. Customs calculated the
final dutiable value of each vehicle by deducting from U.S.$542,036.45 duties of 8.9%
for 1983 entries, 8.3% for 1984 entries, and 7.6% for 1985 entries. Id. n.6. Customs'
appraised value is nearly U.S.$200,000 greater than the value provided for in the con-
tract between KHI and NIC.
149. Id. at 507. A protest is a written statement filed with a district director of
Customs objecting to Customs decisions regarding the following issues:
(1) the appraised value of the imported merchandise;
(2) the classification and rate and amount of duties chargeable;
(3) all charges or exactions of whatever character within the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of the Treasury;
(4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery or a demand for re-
delivery to customs custody under any provision of the customs laws, ex-
cept a determination appealable under section 1337 of this title;
(5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry, or any modification thereof;
(6) the refusal to pay a claim for drawback; and
(7) the refusal to reliquidate an entry under section 1520(c) of this title[.]
19 U.S.C. § 1514(a), (c) (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 174.11 (1992); see supra note 5 (describing
organization of Customs).
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the passenger cars imported in the last five entries. 150  NIAC re-
Protests must be filed within 90 days following (1) the date of notice of liquidation
of the imported merchandise, (2) the date of the decision as to which the protest is
made (e.g., the date of written notice excluding merchandise from entry), or (3) the
date of mailing of notice of demand for payment against a bond in the case of a surety.
19 C.F.R. § 174.12(e). If a protest is not filed within the 90 day time period, Customs
decisions regarding protestable issues are final and conclusive upon all persons, includ-
ing Customs. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). The following parties may file protests:
(1) [t]he importer or consignee shown on the entry papers, or their sureties;
(2) [any person paying any charge or exaction;
(3) [a]ny person seeking entry or delivery;
(4) [a]ny person filing a claim for drawback; or
(5) [a] ny [duly] authorized agent of any of the persons described [above].
19 C.F.R. § 174.12(a) (1992).
After a protest -is filed, the district director must act upon the protest within two
years from the date of filing, unless the protest concerns the exclusion of merchandise,
or if there is a request for an accelerated disposition, in which case Customs must act
upon the protest within 30 days from the date of filing a request for accelerated disposi-
tion. Id. § 174.21 (a), (b); Id, § 174.22(a), (c); Id. § 174.29. If Customs fails to act upon
an accelerated protest within the 30 day time period, the protest is denied by operation
of law. Id. § 174.22(d). Any person whose protest has been denied may contest the
denial of the protest by filing an action in the. United States Court of International
Trade within 180 days after the date of mailing of notice of the denial or the date of the
protest for which an accelerated disposition was requested. Id. § 174.31.
In addition, a protesting party may file an application for further review of a pro-
test with a district director of Customs where the protesting party believes that a Cus-
toms' decision:
(a) [i]s alleged to be inconsistent with a ruling of the Commissioner of Cus-
toms or his designee, or with a decision made in any district with respect
to the same or substantially similar merchandise;
(b) [i]s alleged to involve questions of law or fact which have not been ruled
upon by the Commissioner of Customs or his designee or by the Customs
courts;
(c) [i]nvolves matters previously ruled upon by the Commissioner of Customs
or his designee or by the Customs courts but facts are alleged or legal
arguments presented which were not considered at the time of the origi-
nal ruling; or
(d) [i]s alleged to involve questions which the Headquarters Office, United
States Customs Service, refused to consider in the form of a request for
internal advice.
Id. § 174.24.
In the event the district director denies the protest, the protest is reviewed by the
regional commissioner of Customs, or the Commissioner of Customs if the protest in-
volved lack of uniform treatment of an issue by Customs, the existence of an established
an uniform practice, an interpretation of a court decision or ruling of the Commis-
sioner of Customs, or a question that has not been the subject of a Headquarters, U.S.
Customs Service ruling or court decision. Id. § 174.26(b). If the regional commis-
sioner or Commissioner of Customs subsequently deny the protest, the protesting party
may file seek judicial review in the United States Court of International Trade. Id.
§ 174.31.
150. 982 F.2d at 507.
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quested Customs to issue a ruling that the appraised value of the
vehicles should be based on the lower price provided for in the
KHI contract. 151 Customs refused to issue such a ruling and ad-
hered to its previous decision that the MTA contract price repre-
sented the transaction value of the imported passenger cars.15 2
Arguing that the holding in E.C. McAfee Co. v. United States'53
mandated appraisement of the passenger cars based upon the
KHI contract price, NIAC commenced an action in the Court of
International Trade.'
54
B. The Court of International Trade Decision
The Court of International Trade rejected NIAC's assertion
that McAfee was dispositive in determining the transaction value
of the imported passenger cars.' 55 The court distinguished Mc-
Afee on several grounds. 56 According to the court, McAfee in-
volved two distinct agreements.1 57  The court reasoned that
Nissho Iwai, by contrast, essentially involved one agreement.158
151. Id.
152. Id. at 507-08.
153. 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
154. Nissho Iwai American Corp. v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 644, 647-51,
rev'd, 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing E.C. McAfee Co. v. United States, 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
155. 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 644, 650 rev'd, 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see supra notes
27-35 and accompanying text (discussing transaction value of imported merchandise).
156. 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 644, 648, rev'd, 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Judge Mus-
grave acknowledged, however, that E.C. McAfee Co. v. United States might require that
the appraised value of the passenger cars be based on the KHI-NIC contract:
A clear understanding of the [MTA-NIAC contract] shows that the facts are
decidedly different from McAfee, although a more doctrinaire reading of the
contract in the context of the McAfee case might come to a different conclu-
sion.
Id.
157. Id. at 650. The court reasoned:
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit valued the McAfee transaction
between the assembler and the middleman. It had a choice between two dis-
crete transactions. Here the Court is presented with a manufacturer which
has dealt extensively with the U.S. customer, and a secondary contract which
seems more like an afterthought than a true arms-length transaction. The
result is that the case differs greatly from McAfee.
Id. at 649-50.
158. Id. at 649. The court noted that in McAfee only the middleman had contact
with both the foreign manufacturer and the United States importer, while KHI had
extensive contact with MTA. Id. Judge Musgrave wrote:
Although Kawasaki was not a signatory to the [contract between the MTA
and NIAC], the arrangements made show that it was excluded in only the for-
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Thus, the court did not have the option of choosing between two
independent transactions. 5 9 The court also noted that McAfee
involved a one hundred percent imported suit, while in Nissho
Iwai the imports were fifty-seven percent Japanese and forty-
three percent American. 160 Finally, the court noted that McAfee
involved an assembly operation, whereas the contract between
MTA and NIAC involved manufacturing.' 6'
The court held that NIAC did not overcome the presump-
tion of correctness attaching to Customs' valuation of the im-
ported passenger cars.' 62 Using the "most direct cause" test set
mal sense of the contract. Kawasaki was pre-selected by the MTA as manufac-
turer before the [contract] was signed. Its name appears several times in the
contract, and it had rights and duties according it a major role in the contract.
There were face-to-face meetings between KHI and the MTA. Kawasaki signed
a warranty of performance to both the MTA and NIAC, and agreed to abide by
the terms of the [MTA and NIAC contract]. It was, at the very least, a third-
party beneficiary named explicitly in the [MTA-NIAC contract).
Id. at 649.
159. See supra note 157 (quoting court's language on why court could not choose
between two independent transactions).
160. 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 644, 649, rev'd, 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Judge Mus-
grave did not explain why the commingling of American-made parts was a material
difference between Nissho Iwai and McAfee. Id. In fact, Judge Musgrave acknowledged
that the commingling of American-made parts did not require a different result from
McAfe. Id.
161. Id. at 650. Judge Musgrave reasoned:
The case at bar involves manufactured goods, not assembled merchan-
dise, within the meaning of Customs Regulation 19 C.F.R. § 152.103, and to
the extent that McAfee involved "assembled merchandise," it is inapplicable
here. Kawasaki provided its own raw materials for the Japanese portion of the
cars. As manufacturer rather than assembler, KHI had an interest in the mer-
chandise other than as an assembler under § 152.103(a) (3). Kawasaki also
provided significant technical support and warranty service after delivery.
The McAfee Court framed the questions before it as "whether the custom-
made clothing is assembled merchandise within the meaning of the regulation
and, if so, whether the transaction value of the merchandise should be deter-
mined on that basis, although it held that the transaction value should be
based on the actual price paid rather than the assembly price. But the tailored
suits were assembled from supplied components, and the fact that the [sic]
KHI manufactured the subway cars in large part from scratch is a significant
distinction between the McAfee export transaction and the [NIAC-MTA] con-
tract.
Id. at 650-51 (footnotes omitted).
162. Id. at 644; 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a) (1) (1988); see Federal Election Comm'n v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981) (stating agency's in-
terpretation of statute is entitled to deference); Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733
F.2d 873, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating presumption of correctness attaches to Customs
decision).
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forth in Brosterhous, Coleman & Co. A/C Lurgi Chemie und Htit-
tentechnik GmbH v. United States, 6' the Court of International
Trade concurred with Customs that the contract between the
MTA and NIAC was the "most direct cause" of the exportation of
the passenger cars to the United States because the contract be-
tween MTA and NIAC obligated NIAC to import the passenger
cars.16 4 The court also determined that NIC and KHI were not
related parties pursuant to Section 402.165
163. See supra notes 82-92 (discussing Brosterhous, Coleman & Co. A/C Lurgi
Chemie und Hfittentechnik GmbH v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 1197 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1990)).
164. 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 644, 647, rev'd, 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Judge Mus-
grave reasoned:
In Brosterhous, Coleman & Co. v. United States, an American manufacturer
contracted with a West German firm to construct a chlorine dioxide bleach
plant in the United States. The contract did not specify which subcontractors
should be used and the foreign seller decided to use foreign components.
Brosterhous held that "[w]hen there is more than one sale for exportation, Cus-
toms policy is that transaction value should be calculated according to the sale
which most directly caused the merchandise to be exported to the United
States." The transaction value was the price the foreign seller paid for the
components, rather than the contract amount, because the foreign seller was
free to buy from any supplier, and could have fulfilled the contract by using
only U.S. suppliers. Because the foreign seller was not obligated to buy from
abroad, the contract with the U.S. customer did not primarily cause the goods
to be exported to the United States.
The operative facts in this case are directly contrary to Brosterhous. The
MTA negotiated with NIAC on the express understanding that Kawasaki would
build the cars. The Master Contract specified Kawasaki as the "primary
builder." NIC/NIAC was not free to pick its supplier. It was obligated to buy
from abroad. Following the Brosterhous analysis, the [NIAC-MTA] contract was
the contract which most directly caused the goods to be exported to the
United States.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Brosterhous Coleman & Co. A/C Lurgi Chemie und
Hfittentechnik GmbH v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 1197 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990)).
165. Id. at 651. The court found:
Nissho Japan and KHI agreed to allocate windfall profits and losses in the
Side Agreement, but their interaction did not constitute a partnership or joint
venture to produce the cars under 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(g) (1) (D) (1991). Kawa-
saki and NIC did not share overall profits or losses on the project, or pool
their resources or expertise. Each handled its own area of responsibility as
laid out in the [NIAC-MTA] contract: Kawasaki manufactured, and Nissho Ja-
pan administered.
Nissho Japan and Kawasaki each owned no more than one percent of the
other, so they were not "related parties" within the meaning of the cross-own-
ership provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(g)(1)(F) (1991). Their involvement
does tend to show that the agreements between NIC and KHI were of a differ-
ent nature from the foreign-transactions in either Getz or McAfee.
Id.; see supra note 7 (defining term "related parties").
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C. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Mc-
Afee' 66 was binding precedent for valuing import transactions in-
volving middlemen. 16 7  In McAfee,168 the court reasoned that
where both the first and second tier *transactions meet the ele-
ments of Section 402,169 the first tier transaction, rather than the
second tier transaction, was the basis of the transaction value of
the imported merchandise.170  As a result, the Federal Circuit
166. McAfee, 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
167. Nissho Iwai, 982 F.2d at 510-Il. Writing for the unanimous court, Judge Lou-
rie reasoned:
Accepting that both the manufacturer's price and the middleman's price
may serve as the basis of transaction value, the critical issue on appeal here
centers upon which price is legally proper. In view of the controlling and
binding authority of McAfee, we hold that the transaction value of the im-
ported passenger cars at issue must be based on the KHI-NIC contract price.
The trial court, however, determined that McAfee was distinguishable
from the instant case and thus did not consider it controlling authority in
appraising the transaction value of the imported vehicles. Instead, the court
employed the analysis set forth in Brosterhous, 737 F. Supp. 1197 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1990), in determining that the transaction value should be based on the
price paid by the purchaser. We agree with NIAC that the trial court commit-
ted reversible error in failing to follow the controlling authority of McAfee.
Although the trial court cited differences in the material facts of McAfee,
none supports its conclusion that those differences mandate a different result.
The trial court determined that McAfee is inapplicable because it involved "as-
sembled merchandise" within the meaning of 19 C.F.R. § 152.103 and did not
involve the valuation of manufactured goods. The court found that KHI had
an interest in the imported vehicles other than as an assembler because KHI
was extensively involved in the negotiations with the MTA and that KHI pos-
sessed a significant stake in the ensuing contract between MTA and NIAC.
That distinction, however, does not take this case out from under the rule of
McAfee. In fact, it emphasizes KHI's role in the export of the vehicles to the
United States, supporting the conclusion that its sale to NIC is the legally-
controlling transaction.
The ultimate issue in McAfee was whether the assembly price of the im-
ported merchandise, rather than the price paid by the purchaser, should serve
as the basis for determining transaction value. Similarly, the critical issue here
is whether the sales price paid by NIC to KHI should serve as the basis for
appraising the transaction value of the imported vehicles. McAfee speaks di-
rectly to that question and answers it in the affirmative. That case is not only
applicable here, it is dispositive.
Id. at 510-11 (footnote omitted) (citing Generra Sportswear Co. v. United States, 905
F.2d 377, n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
168. 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
169. See supra note 7 (discussing statutory requirements of Section 402).
170. McAfee, 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir.1988); see supra notes 114-29 and accompany-
ing text (discussing E.C. McAfee Co. v. United States, 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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held that the Court of International Trade erred in affirming
Customs' determination that based transaction value on the sec-
ond tier transaction between MTA and NIAC. 17 1
In following McAfee, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that
Nissho Iwai applies solely to situations in which there exists a le-
gitimate choice between two statutorily viable transactions. 172
The existence of a viable transaction for determining the trans-
action value of imported merchandise depends upon the pres-
ence of two fact-specific elements.17 3 First, the goods must be
"clearly destined" for export to the United States.' 74 Second, the
manufacturer and middleman must deal with each other at
arms-length.1
75
171. 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Significantly, two Court of International Trade
cases decided subsequent to Nissho Iwai have adhered to Nissho Iwai's holding that U.S.
importers are entitled to valuation based on the first tier transaction. Synergy Sport
International, Ltd. v. United States, No. 91-11-00836, slip op. 93-5 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan.
12, 1993); Generra Sportswear, Inc. v. United States, No. 88-07-00474S (Ct Int'l Trade
June 29, 1993) (order granting plaintiff's motion to remand entries to district directors
for reliquidation). In addition, Customs has since established guidelines for applying
Nissho Iwai to import transactions. DIRECTOR OF CUSTOMS OFFICE OF TRADE OPERA-
TIONS, EFFCT OF NiSSHO IWAI AND RELATED CASES ON FIELD OPERATIONS (Mar. 8, 1993).
The guidelines provide:
1. Entered values based on a sale from a manufacturer to a middleman may
be liquidated once the importer has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the
import specialist that the sale from the manufacturer to the middleman was
a bona fide sale for export to the U.S. and was at arm's length. Import
specialists are referred to Customs notice on transfer pricing for guidance
on what constitutes an arm's length transaction when parties to a Sale are
related (58 Fed. Reg. 5445 January 21, 1993).
2. Protests of entered values on-liquidated entry summaries, based on the de-
cisions in Nissho Iwai, Synergy, Court No. 91-11-00836 (Ct. Int'l TradeJan-
uary 12, 1993), McAfee, 6 Fed.Cir. (T) 92, 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
and related court cases, may be allowed once the importer establishes that
the sale from the manufacturer to the middleman was a bona fide sale for
export to the U.S. and was at arm's length, as indicated above.
Id.
172. Id. The Federal Circuit cautioned that not every contract between a foreign
manufacturer and foreign middleman may serve as the basis for calculating appraised
value. Id. at 509. Such a rule would threaten tariff revenues if manufacturers conspire
with importers to charge artificially low prices. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. Judge Lourie stated:
[T]he rule only applies where there is a legitimate choice between two statuto-
rily viable transaction values. The manufacturer's price constitutes a viable
transaction value when the goods are clearly destined for export to the United
States and when the manufacturer and the middleman deal with each other at
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The Federal Circuit found that Nissho Iwai involved two via-
ble transactions for determining the transaction value of the im-
ported merchandise. 176  The Federal Circuit characterized the
first tier transaction between KHI and NIC as a viable transaction
for determining transaction value because the imported passen-
ger cars were manufactured for a specific U.S. purchaser and
had no possible alternative destination. 177 In addition, the KHI
contract was the result of arms-length bargaining. 17
More significantly, the Federal Circuit also overruled the
"most direct cause" test of Brosterhous, Coleman & Co. v. United
States.'79 According to the Federal Circuit, nothing in the legis-
arm's length, in the absence of any non-market influences that affect the legit-
imacy of the sales price.
Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. Judge Lourie wrote:
In this case, the vehicles that were the subject of the KHI-NIC contract were
manufactured for a specific United States purchaser, -the MTA. They were
unquestionably intended for "exportation to the United States" and had no
possible alternative destination.,
Id. at 509.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 511. The court proceeded:
In the interest of clarifying the law, we consider it necessary to examine
the case of Brosterhous, Coleman & Co. v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 1197 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1990), upon which the trial court relied in reaching its decision.
The court in Brosterhous held that where there are two transactions that can be
considered to be sales for importation to the United States, "Customs policy is
that transaction value should be calculated according to the sale which most
directly caused the merchandise to be exported to the United States." Id. at
1199.
The U.S. Customs Service issued a seminal ruling in CLA-2 CO:PR:CV:V,
5429238 BLS, TAA #57, C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. 811 (January 21, 1983) in
which it stated its position that "the transaction to which the phrase 'when sold
for exportation to the United States' refers when there are two or more trans-
actions which might give rise to a transaction value, is the transaction which
most directly causes the merchandise to be exported to the United States."
C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. at 813. In so ruling, Customs acknowledged that
under 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b), as it existed before amendment by the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, "it was possible to use as the sale for exportation to
the United States for purposes of determining statutory export value a sale
from a foreign seller to a foreign buyer, who in turn sold the merchandise to a
United States importer." However, Customs departed from that view because
the Trade Agreements Act replaced "export value" with "transaction value" as
the primary basis for valuation. Thus Customs concluded that "cases decided
under the prior law are not, therefore, necessarily precedent under the [Trade
Agreements Act]." C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. Bull. at 813.
We reject the Customs Service's rationale as being legally unsound. A
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lative history of Section 402 supported a rule requiring consider-
ation of which transaction is the "most direct cause" of an expor-
tation.""0 The Federal Circuit reasoned that judicial precedent
prior to the 1979 amendment of Section 402 supported rejection
of a "most direct cause" test since the current version of Section
402 and its predecessor both required a sale for exportation to
the United States. l8'
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REJECTED THE
"MOST DIRECT CAUSE" TEST RESULTING IN
SIGNMICANT DUTY-SAVINGS FOR
AMERICAN IMPORTERS
In Nissho Iwai American Corp. v. United States,18 2 the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit correctly rejected the "most di-
rect cause" test used by Customs in applying Section 402 to trans-
actions involving middleman pricing."1 By holding that an im-
porter is entitled to appraisement based on the first tier transac-
tion, the Federal Circuit significantly clarified customs valuation
law concerning import transactions involving middlemen. 8 4
Further, although there are limits to the availability of savings
similar argument was rejected by the court in McAfee, which recognized that
"the language of the earlier statute is not significantly different from the ...
provision of the current statute." 842 F.2d at 318, 6 Fed. Cir. at 97. We agree
with NIAC that the 1979 amendment did not change the operative language
of the statutory provision for valuation which requires that the sale be "for
exportation to the United States." Further, we can discern nothing in the leg-
islative history of the 1979 amendment that suggests that Customs... should
undertake an investigation focusing on which of two transactions most directly
caused the exportation. The "Customs policy" followed by Brosterhous pro-
ceeds from an invalid premise. To the extent Brosterhous is inconsistent with
this court's decision in McAfee by requiring a weighing of the relative impor-
tance of two viable transactions, it is overruled.
Id. at 511; see Brosterhous, Coleman & Co. v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 1197 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1990); see also supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text (discussing Brosterhous,
Coleman & Co. v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 1197 (CL Int'l Trade 1990)).
180. 982 F.2d at 511; see supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text (discussing legis-
lative history of Section 402).
181. 982 F.2d at 511; see supra notes 96-113 and accompanying text (discussing
judicial precedent on middleman pricing prior to enactment of TAA); see also supra
note 7 (discussing statutory requirements of Section 402).
182. 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
183. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (describing transactions involv-
ing middlemen).
184. See supra note 179 (quoting court's clarification of customs valuation law con-
cerning import transactions involving middlemen).
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under the Federal Circuit's decision, Nissho Iwai should result in
duty-savings for U.S. importers since first tier transactions be-
tween non-U.S. manufacturers and middlemen should be of less
value than second tier transactions between non-U.S. middle-
men and U.S. importers." 5
A. The Federal Circuit Correctly Rejected the "Most Direct Cause" Test
Subsequent to the enactment of the TAA, Customs used a
"most direct cause" test to determine which of two viable transac-
tions should form the basis of transaction value.'8 6 Customs' ra-
tionale for employing a "most direct cause" test was that the TAA
had replaced export value with transaction value as the primary
basis for valuation.' 7 According to Customs, pre-1979 case law,
such as United States v. Getz Bros. & Co., 8' did not govern valua-
tion issues raised under the Trade Agreements Act.18 9
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit correctly char-
acterized Customs' rationale as legally unsound, finding that the
TAA did not change the operative language of Section 402.190
Therefore, Customs had no reason to distinguish cases decided
prior to the TAA. In United States v. S.S. Kresge Co. 9' and its
progeny, the courts clearly and consistently held that appraise-
ment should not be based on the second tier transaction if the
first tier transaction satisfies the requisite statutory elements of
Section 402.192 Even Customs recognized that the operative lan-
guage of Section 402 did not change after enactment of the
185. See supra note 11 (defining middleman as one who buys at one price for pur-
pose of reselling at higher price).
186. See supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text (discussing Customs rulings on
middleman pricing).
187. See supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text (discussing Customs rulings on
middleman pricing); see also supra notes 39-59 (discussing enactment of TAA).
188. 55 C.C.P.A. 11 (1967); see supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing United States v. Getz Bros. & Co., 55 C.C.P.A. 11 (1967)).
189. See C.S.D. 81-72, 15 Cust. Bull. at 880 ("[W]hile judicial decisions construing
provisions of the old and new laws are pertinent, they are in no way binding upon this
agency when construing similar provisions under the TAA."), revoked on other grounds,
Customs Ruling Letter No. 542,643 (Oct. 19, 1981).
190. 982 F.2d at 511; see supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text (discussing legis-
lative history of Section 402); see also supra note 7 (discussing statutory 'requirements of
Section 402).
191. 26 C.C.P.A. 349 (1939).
,192. See supra notes 96-114 and accompanying text (discussing judicial cases on
middleman pricing decided prior to enactment of TAA); see also supra note 7 (discuss-
ing statutory requirements of Section 402)..
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Customs' reliance on the legislative history of Section 402
was equally misplaced. Nothing in the legislative history of Sec-
tion 402 supported application of a "most direct cause" test. 194
Although the legislative history of Section 402 stated that valua-
tion generally would be based on information readily available in
the United States,' 95 it does not follow that the transaction value
of imported merchandise has to be based on the transaction that
"most directly causes" merchandise to be exported to the United
States. 19 6 Customs itself ruled that the situs of a sale is irrelevant
to determining whether the transaction qualifies as a sale for ex-
portation to the United States.'97 Reliance on the legislative his-
tory of Section 402 was simply an attempt tojustify an otherwise
unjustifiable policy.
B. Nissho Iwai Clarified Customs Valuation Law, Bringing Duty-
Savings Within the Reach of U.S. Importers
By holding that an importer is entitled to appraisement
based on the lower of two viable transaction values, the Federal
Circuit clarified the law applicable to customs valuation of im-
port transactions involving middleman pricing.'98 A significant
shortcoming of the Federal Circuit's decision in E.C. McAfee Co.
v. United States'9 9 was its failure to address the validity of Cus-
toms' "most direct cause" test. Customs limited McAfee to its
193. See C.S.D. 81-72, 15 Cust. Bull. 876, 880 (1980) ("It is significant that [the
definition of transaction value of imported merchandise] and the definitions of export
value under the old and new laws contain the identical language 'for exportation to the
United States.'"), revoked, Customs Ruling Letter No. 542,643 (Oct. 19, 1981); see also
supra notes 39-59 (discussing legislative history of Trade Agreements Act).
194. See supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of
Section 402).
195. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 6, at 456; see supra notes 39-59 and
accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Section 402).
196. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text (use of "most direct cause" test
may result in basing transaction value on first tier transaction).
197. General Notice, 26 Cust. B. & Dec., No. 8 at 13 (Jan. 27, 1992) ("[T]he situs of
a sale is not relevant to the determination of whether merchandise is 'sold for exporta-
tion to the United States' within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b) (1)."); see supra
note 7 (discussing requirements of transaction value of imported merchandise).
198. See supra note 179 (quoting court's clarification of customs valuation law con-
cerning transactions involving middlemen).
199. 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text
(discussing E.C. McAfee Co. v. United States). "
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facts and continued to use the "most direct cause" test.20 0 Nissho
Iwai clarified the proposition originally articulated in McAfee
which stated that importers were entitled to the benefit of the
lower of two viable transaction values and that Customs' test was
improper. In the two Court of International Trade decisions
rendered subsequent to Nissho Iwai, the Court of International
Trade ruled that an importer was entitled to valuation based on
the first tier transaction.0 1 Customs has since established guide-
lines for applying Nissho Iwai to import transactions.0 2
Moreover, the Federal Circuit in Nissho Iwai established a
flexible standard for determining whether future transactions
qualify as a sale for exportation to the United States.20 3 In Nissho
Iwai, the Federal Circuit held that goods need only be "clearly
destined" for the United States to meet the requirements of Sec-
tion 402.204 An importer should be able to meet the require-
ments of Nissho Iwai if the design, marking, specifications, or
other features of the goods or transaction indicate that the
goods were manufactured for sale to the United States. As a re-
sult, U.S. importers buying from unrelated middlemen may real-
ize considerable duty-savings since Customs will appraise imports
based on the lower price associated with the first tier transaction.
At least one estimate indicates that importers could potentially
200. Customs Ruling Letter No. 544179 (Apr. 1, 1988). Customs stated:
[I]t is Headquarter's position that the holding of [McAfee] is clearly limited by
the language of the court to the facts which are preculiar [sic] to this case...
Accordingly, insofar as Headquarters is concerned, the principles set forth
within the subject court case should only be applied with regard to the impor-
tation of made-to-measure clothing when the distributor and tailor are located
in the same country. Further, all field offices should be satisfied that the cloth-
ing involved is in fact made-to-measure.
Id.; see supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text (discussing E.C. McAfee Co. v. United
States, 842 F.2d 314 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
201. Synergy Sport International, Ltd. v. United States, No. 91-11-00836, slip op.
93-5 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 12, 1993); Generra Sportswear, Inc. v. United States, No. 88-
07-00474S (Ct. Int'l Trade June 29, 1993) (order granting plaintiffs motion to remand
entries to district directors for reliquidation); see supra note 171 (discussing Court of
International Trade adherence to holding of Nissho Iwai).
202. See supra note 170 (quoting Customs' guidelines on applying Nissho Iwai to
import transactions involving middlemen).
203. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text (discussing "clearly destined"
requirement of Nissho Iwai).
204. Nissho Iwai American Corp. v. United States, 982 F.2d at 509; see supra note 7
(discussing statutory requirements of Section 402).
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save hundreds of millions of dollars under Nissho Iwai.205
C. Limitations on Obtaining Duty Savings Under Nissho Iwai
The availability of substantial savings under Nissho Iwai is
limited by several factors. First, the Federal Circuit did not pro-
vide guidance on what constitutes "clearly destined."2°6 Thus, it
is not clear what proof the court requires to demonstrate that
merchandise sold from a non-U.S. manufacturer to a non-U.S.
middleman is destined for the United States. Presumably, how-
ever, merchandise manufactured according to specifications
provided by the U.S. importer or U.S. government standards
should meet the clearly destined test.
Second, the ability of the importer to save duties depends
on the importer's ability to persuade the middleman to disclose
the price the middleman paid to the non-U.S. manufacturer. In
order to base appraised value on the sale between the non-U.S.
manufacturer and the non-U.S. middleman, the importer must
know the value of that transaction. It is unlikely that an im-
porter will learn the value of the transaction between the non-
U.S. manufacturer and non-U.S. middleman since the middle-
man buys from the manufacturer for the purpose of reselling
the merchandise to the importer at a higher price.20 7 An im-
porter may expect a middleman to be hesitant to reveal his
profit margin. If the importer does substantial business with the
middleman, however, the importer may have some leverage to
obtain the value of the transaction between the manufacturer
and the middleman.
Third, to temper the effects of Nissho Iwai, Customs may
scrutinize the relationship between the importer and the mid-
dleman to determine if a principal-agent relationship exists. If
Customs determines that the middleman is an agent of the im-
porter, Customs may deem the middleman's profit to be a sell-
ing commission, which is dutiable under Section 402.208
Finally, importers purchasing from middlemen that are re-
205. Louise Lucas, U.S. Tax Ruling Will Slash Hong Kong Firms' Bills, SOUTH CHINA
MORNtNG POST, Jan. 22, 1993, Business, at 2.
206. See supra notes 174-5 and accompanying text (discussing "clearly destined"
requirement of Nissho lwai).
207. See supra note 11 (defining middleman).
208. See supra note 9 (discussing additions to price paid or payable).
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lated 219 to the importer must consider the adverse tax implica-
tions of reducing dutiable value.210 Section 1059A of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code prohibits an imported product purchased
from a related 21 ' overseas party from being carried at an inven-
tory value greater than the amount at which it is valued for trans-
action value purposes.21 2 Thus, an importer should only argue
for reducing appraised value if the duty savings are greater than
the increased tax liability resulting from a lower cost of goods
sold. Given the generally low rates of duty, importers buying
from related middlemen may not benefit from Nissho Iwai.
CONCLUSION
Section 402 case law requires Customs to calculate ap-
praised value based on the price charged by the non-U.S. manu-
facturer to the non-U.S. middleman if there are two sales that
qualify as the basis for appraised value. Accordingly, in Nissho
Iwai the Federal Circuit correctly rejected Customs' practice of
denying importers the benefits of appraised value based on the
manufacturer's price. As a result, Nissho Iwai brought considera-
ble duty-savings within the reach of importers. While there are
limits on the application of Nissho Iwai, importers should ade-
quately examine their import transactions to determine whether
they qualify for duty-savings.
Michael E. Roll*
209. See supra note 7 (defining "related parties").
210. 26 U.S.C. § 1059A (1988).
211. 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Congress limited application of
Section 1059A of the Internal Revenue Code to those parties that are related within the
meaning of Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. Section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code defines related parties as:
two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorpo-
rated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affili-
ated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests
Id.; see supra note 7 (noting tax implications of transaction value of imported merchan-
dise between related parties); cf supra note 7 (defining "related parties" under Section
402).
212. 26 U.S.C. § 1059A. Section 1059A prevents a company from inflating the in-
ventory value of imported merchandise to increase the amount of its cost of goods sold
deduction and simultaneously reducing the value of goods from its related foreign sup-
plier to reduce customs duty liability. Id.; see supra note 7 (discussing transaction value
of imported merchandise).
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